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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOI-IN E. McNAUGHTON and
HENRIETTA McNAUGHTON,
his wife,
Appellants and Plaintiffs,
vs.
JOHN B. EATON, an unmarried
man; MYRTLE ROSS; JAMES H.
FISHER and CUNA FISHER,
husband and wife; RICE COOPER
and EDITH R. LAWRENCE
COOPER, husband and wife; W.
S. ROSS; and FERN ROSS FAWCETT; JACK TURNER and
MARIE TURNER, his wife, and
MYRON PERRY,
Respondents and Defendants

Case No.

8277

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This case was previously before the Supreme
Court where the question of whether or not the waters here involved were public waters and subject
1
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to appropriation and the rules applicable to such
public waters was decided. The Supreme Court ruled
that they were public waters, and remanded the case
with directions. The present appeal by the plaintiffs
stems from the further proceedings as directed by
this court.
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS

The factual picture so far as this case is concerned is before the court in the form of the prior
decision in the case together with the record therein,
and in the form of a transcript of the proceedings
upon the further hearing after the remand. Since
the appeal raises questions concerning the sufficiency
of evidence, these matters can best be considered from
a factual standpoint in connection with the arguments on such points.
However, it might be appropriate at the outset
to point out that this court in remanding the case
pointed out very significantly what was expected of
the trial court in the further proceedings. First it
reaffirmed certain well-defined principles of water
law as follows: (242 P. 2d 570 at p. 572)
"Beneficial use is the basis, the measure
and ihe limit of all right to the use of water
in this state. Such has been the law both under
and before we had a statute to that effect. No
one can acquire the right to use more water
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than is necessary, vvith reasonable efficiency,
to satisfy his beneficial requirements, even
strangers have been allowed to make improvements to water systems which would save water and thereby acquire the right to beneficially use the water saved. And water reduced to possession may not lawfully, in bad
faith, be vvasted and thereby deprive others
of its beneficial use."
and concluded the decision as follows:
" ... It is clear that all of these waters
are subject to appropriation and the only right
that can be acquired to their use is a reasonably efficient beneficial use, and defendants
as subsequent appropriators are entitled to the
use of all of such waters not necessary to satisfy such requirements of plaintiffs."
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
I

Appellants corre~tly assert that the pronouncements of the court on the original appeal are the law
of the case.
II
The Court properly limited plaintiffs' use of
water to 2 C.F.S. upon a fixed time schedule.
III

The trial court fixed the irrigation season at 150
days at the instance of the appellant who cannot
now be heard to attack the determination.

IV
The trial court properly restricted the plaintiffs
from interfering with the balance of the waters of
McNaughton Gulch.

v
The evidence justifies the award of 3.5 feet of
water per acre.
VI
The decree in no way affects the McNaughton
Canal waters.
VII
The court properly determined the irrigated
acreage to be 66.03 acres on the basis of the evidence
available to him.
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5
ARGUMENT
POINT I
Appellants correctly assert that the pronouncements
of this Court on the original appeal are the law of the
case.

Respondents have no quarrel with Point I of
Appellants' Brief insofar as it states the above entitled proposition. Respondents do however, feel that
the Appellants lose sight of this proposition of law
elsewhere in their brief, and particularly at Point IV,
as will hereinafter be more particularly pointed out
under Respondents' argument on that point.
Respondents feel that the Trial Court had this
principle well in mind in analyzing the extent to
vvhich he was required to re-open the case under
the Supreme Court's former decision.
In his Memorandum Decision ( P. 2) the Trial
Court reviewed the decision of the Supreme Court,
and then said:
"Restating the above so that it is more
directly pointed to the present query, the court
simply and directly states that the plaintiffs
have the right to use all of the water of the
McNaughton Gulch which, when used with
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reasonable efficiency, is sufficient 'to satisfy
the beneficial use of their (plaintiffs') appropriation.' "
Elsewhere in his Memorandum Decision (P. 5)
the court restates the problem as follows:
''Thus under the mandate, we are to determine how much of the gulch water is reasonably necessary for plaintiff to use in a
reasonably efficient manner in order to produce his crops upon 66.03 acres of land which
must be watered by diversion from the gulch."
and again, at P. 6:
"Thus, the quantity of gulch water which
the plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest
had diverted fr.om the gulch and applied to
beneficial use prior to 1903, is the amount of
water that he now has the right to divert and
use. It is our problem to find o~t what that
was."
The case then so far as the further proceedings
were concerned, was addressed to the inquiry, "What
water rights do the plaintiffs have based upon beneficial use thereof as fixed prior to 1903? And with
the recognition of the rights of the defendants to
any waters in excess of those rights as indicated by
the quote from the Supreme Court's original opinion
as set out heretofore in Respondents' Additional Statement of Facts, P. 2.
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POINT II
The Court properly limited plaintiffs' use of water
to 2 C.F.S. upon a fixed time schedule.

Appellants assertion of error stemming from the
2 C.F.S. award which the court made for a fixed period of 92 hours and 24 minutes each 1 0-day period
appears to be predicated upon the theory that because
the flovv was not constant that plaintiffs should not
be boun.d by any limitation. This does violence to
the evidence upon which the trial court found the
facts, both at the original trial and at the retrial.
The impression apparently sought to be created
in appellants' brief, by the undue emphasis upon the
findings of the trial court as to variation from day
to day and season to season, and from a flow of several cubic feet to a low ebb when the flow is negligible, is that a great deal of the time the flow is
negligible. Let us therefore, analyze the evidence
to allay such a misconception.
On the 23rd day of February, 1954, four months
after all irrigation had ceased on surrounding lands,
their own witness, David Gardner, found 11h second
feet of v\·ater in the Gt1lch at Dam No. 3, plaintiff's
only dam on his own premises (Retrial R. 30-31).
Ed Tyzach, for plaintiffs, testified of visiting the
Gulch to fish, svvim or catch muskrats sometime near
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but after 1900 ( R. 22) . Asher Merkley for plaintiffs
stated that he had never seen the Gulch dry and that
for the past 40 years there has always been from
three to seven cubic feet second flow into Ashley
Central Canal from McNau·ghton Gulch (R. 63-64).
He. continued to say that he knew the only water
defendants had to irrigate their lands came from
MeN a ugh ton Gulch and that they had always raised
a crop (R. 66-67-68). Ed Hoeft had never seen the
Gulch dry and always irrigated 30 acres himself
from the Gulch (R. 108). Ernest Johnson later owned
the H~eft place and always had plenty of water to
irrigate 30 acres and never had to go up stream (R.
121, 125). McNaughton can only remember one year
when water did not run through his east fence (R.
202) and during water time he turns water out on
pasture and then it drains and goes back down the
Gulch ( R. 206-207) . L. P. Christensen found 1 ~
cubic feet second being diverted to North from vicinity of lower McNaughton Dam and~ cubic feet second to the South during time of first trial in July
and forepart of August, 1950. (R. 244, 253). On August 1st, 1950, James Fisher estimated 2 feet in diversion to the North of McNaughton No. 3 (R. 282).
W. Simpson Ross remembers only one year that water did not flow in Gulcl1 (R. 322). It is admitted by
all that until 1948 all parties had and used water
from McNaughton Gulch and apparently had sufficient to mature their crops without incident.
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The record ther1, definitely established that
there is always a considerable flow in McNaughton
Gulch. That it flows year round. That its constant
flow varies fro1n season to season only as other
streams may vary because of wet years or extreme
drougl1t conditions. That irrigation practices effect
the flow only by adding to the already constant flow
of the Gulch. The trial court, after considering all
evidence, deter1nined that the variations of the Gulch
\vere not of such a nature which would prevent McNaughton from obtaining the irrigation head necessary to properly irrigate his land if he followed the
irrigation practices he had used in the past by taking
all water of the Gulch not to exceed 2 cubic feet second and addi11g it to his canal water for a period of
92 hours 24 minutes each ten days. McNaughton's
own testimony substantiates this determination. McNaughton stated he needed a stream of 1 to 1 ;6 feet
to get over his ground CR. 157) which he repeated
as being the desired flow and volumn to cover his
land CR. 200). He added that if the Gulch didn't flow
that much he supplemented it with canal water CR.
1-JS, 157) but that some summers it wasn't necessary
to use canal water at all.
McNaughton testified that the 12;6 shares of
stock he owned in Ashley Upper Canal Co. was the
same stock his predecessors had used and that the
McNaughton land involved in this suit is irrigated
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by water from the Ashley Upper Canal Company. (R.
209, 210, 211, 212). He also stated that he now leases
his canal stock and also practically all of his 125
shares in Ashley Valley reservoir; that 1 share of
Upper Ashley Canal stock is allowed to each 10
acres of land (R. 154, .155).
The trial court very painstakingly reviewed the
evidence in his Memorandum Decision on this question of the flow of waters in the Gulch, and has in
that Memorandum Decision preserved his analysis
for review by the Supreme Court. We call the Court's
attention particularly to pages 8 through 16.
It should also be noted that the court granted
the plaintiff .5 acre feet more water per acre than
he felt the evidence otherwise justified on the basis
of existing variables. (See Memorandum Decision
(P. 15).
POINT Ill
The Trial Court fixed the irrigation season at 150
days at the instance of the appellants, who cannot now
be heard to attack that determination.

The court in its Memorandum Decision adopted
a growing season of 180 days. There was considerable
evidence at the retrial of this matter concerning this
precise point, and for convenience of the court we
herewith abstract the same:
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David I. Gardner, an engineer called by McNaughton testified that growing season for grain was
90 to 100 days and for alfalfa 180 days (Retrial R. 8,
53) but stated his testimony was based on experience
in other parts of the state, not Ashley Valley. (Retria~
R. 71, 44). After qualifying as an expert he expressed
his opinion that McNaughton land would require six
acre feet of water per year to mature crops (Retrial
R. 20, 75). He freely admitted however that he had
never made an experiment in Ashley Valley (Retrial 44, 71); that he had only been through Vernal
3 times (Retrial 76); and had only visited the McNaughton property once and that was for approximately one hour just preceeding the trial during
vvhich he had vYalked up and down the Gulch and
viewed the premises from an automobile along the
highway (Retrial27, 35, 36).
In contrast, L. P. Christensen, testified that he
was a Civil Engineer with 34 years experience in
Ashley Valley and in charge of distribution of waters
in Ashley Valley since 1920. (Retrial 88). Mr. Christensen stated that 3 acre feet per acre per year would
adequately irrigate the McNaughton land (Retrial93,
95). Mr. Christensen, after taking into consideration
water table and type of soil, pointed out that one
share of water in Ashley Upper was allotted to each
10 acres and that it would produce on the average
) acre feet per acre per year. (Retrial 92). One share
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of Ashley Valley .2 acre feet per acre per year (Retrial 93). Mr. Christensen repeated that John McNaughton owned 12.5 shares of Ashley Upper and
125 shares Reservoir (R. 254, 255, Retrial R. 89). On
the first hearing Mr. Christensen testified that 1 share
to 10 acres in Ashley Upper and 1 share to each acre
in Ashley Reservoir would in normal years provide
a full water right for land in Ashley Valley ( R. 260),
McNaughtons ovvn only 80 acres of land.
The trial court noted the discrepancy in the
testimony of the experts. Which one is in a better
position to know? vVhich one is experienced in Ashley Valley? What is the situation on other lands in
the Valley? The court granted plaintiffs 3.5 acre feet
per acre per year and the growing season of 180 days.
The maximum requested. (Memorandum decision
page 15-16). Then upon plaintiffs own Motion for
Further Consideration and Memorandum in Support
thereof, plaintiffs testimony to the contrary, the
court shortened the irrigation season to 150 days
(Court order correcting Memorandum Decision) . In
the face of this record it is difficult to find reason in
plaintiffs now charging error with reference. to the
irrigation season limitation fixed and shortened at
their own request.
The court's limitation is only upon the plaintiffs
use of Gulch water and is based upon that diverted
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and beneficially applied prior to 1903. They have
historically had and used the above mentioned canal
water upon their lands. The court has determined
what use plaintiff made of Gulch water prior to 1903
and awarded that to them. The plaintiff can take
that much vvater from the Gulch whether or not there
remains sufficient water for defendants even though
they also have historically had sufficient water from
the Gulch to irrigate their lands.
The Appellants having importuned the trial
cotlrt to shorten the season to 150 days, which matter
was acceded to by the Respondents and the Trial
Court, it would seemingly come with ill grace for
the Appellants to predicate error thereon. If their
clisagreen1ent is both with the length of irrigation
season, and with the duty of water, certainly it would
seem that they must stand their ground in both respects if they are to be heard on appeal on both
matters, rather than affirmatively suggest a shorter
season be entered in the findings.·
The Court was amply justified in its findings in
regard to this point, and what the Court did in effect
was to limit one of the rights of the appellants (plaintiffs) at their own request. In this respect, the Trial
Court was merely doing what this court has on occasion done, that is, comply with the request of a
party where his rights may be greater, but where for
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special reasons he does not desire to have them asserted fully. Wolfe v. White, Utah, 225 P. 2d 729.
What the appellants really seek to do under this
point, however, it appears, is to attack indirectly the
finding of the trial court that 3.5 acre feet is the
reasonable duty of water in the present instance. The
anamoly, if existant, is one created by the appellants,
and not one of the court's making. The evidence on
the question of duty of water is treated by Respondents elsewhere in this brief, and clearly preponderates in favor of the trial court's ruling.
POINT IV
The Trial Court properly restricted the plaintiffs from
interfering with the balance of the waters of McNaughton
Gulch.

Appellants are most unrealistic in their claim
under point IV of their brief that error exists by reason of the restrictions which the court placed upon
them.
The matter of the existence of a right to form
the basis for the restrictions appears to be fully and
completely disposed of by the factual picture as it
developed in this case, and by the opinion of the
Supreme Court on the previous appeal. 242 P 2d 570.
The present lawsuit was precipitated by the
assertion of the defendants of their rights in the Me-
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Naughton Gulch waters. The plaintiffs as upper
stream users are in a position to interfere with the
defendants use, and by their actions prior to suit
and by bringing suit, they have manifest every intention and desire to completely nullify the rights
of lower stream users. 1,his has been the exact nature
of their approach to the problem. Obviously then,
if the plaintiffs as upper users do not willingly comply with the judgment of the court, the situation is
one which is fraught with possibility of serious consequences.
It rather begs the question to say that the court
cannot be realistic in its approach to a problem so
serious and real as is this one. The history of the
West is filled with instances of physical violence
engendered by disagreements over water rights and
water turns. Certainly the court is not required to
close its eyes to just such a problem after having determined that the plaintiff is not entitled to stop all
lower users from obtaining water as he began doing
in 1948, and as he seeks to do permanently.
Appellants, since they have no rights in the waters in excess of the beneficial use as fixed by the
Court are not adversely affected by the restraints
imposed upon them, unless they contemplate violation of the decree and continued use of the excess
waters.
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The appellants cite numerous cases establishing
the proposition that the court could not properly impose restraints on behalf of the defendants because
it was not established that they had rights. In the
case of Dameron Valley Reservoir v. Bleak, 61 Utah
230, 211 P. 974, the facts make the case completely
distinguishable. The case commenced by the plaintiff
seeking an injunction was unsuccessful when he
failed to establish prior righ~s to those of the defendant.
In the case of Stauffer v. Utah Oil Refining Co.,
85 Utah 388, 39 P. 2d 725, the plaintiff sought an injunction based upon rights which he unsuccessfully
asserted, because he failed to establish that defendants were using waters in excess of their entitlement. Having failed to establish the rights upon
which the injunction was asserted, the rule followed
that plaintiff could not obtain the injunction for
interference with those rights.
In the principle case the plaintiff commenced
the suit and asserted rights against the defendant
which they have been partially unsuccessful in maintaining in that they have not been able to establish·
unqualified right to the waters of McNaughton
Gulch. The assertion of the right to all of the waters
howeyer makes it clear that their claim does interfere
with the rights of the defendant. The suit as com-
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me11ced by the plaintiff was not intended as an adjudication of the specific rights of the various defendants, but was the assertion of the rights of the
plaintiffs in derrogation of the rights of the defendants in general.
rfo raise the contention that defendants established no rights to water from the Gulch is highly
unrealistic. It flies in the face of the evidence at the
trial initially and the retrial, and furthermore, overlooks one of the basic premises upon which the plaintiffs predicate their appeal. That is, that the first
decision of the Supreme Court has become the law
of the case. In that opinion the court said: (242 P.
2d -570)
" ... defendants as subsequer1t appropriators are entitled to the use of all of such waters not necessary to satisfy such requirements
of the plaintiffs."
It is not necessary for the rights of the defendants as against each other to be fully adjudicated in
this proceedings in order that the plaintiffs be restrained from interfering with those rights. It is
sufficient that as betweer1 the plaintiffs and the defendants generally it be established that the rights
do exist. The remand to the District Court establishes
this fact, and forecloses the plaintiffs on this point.
Powerine Company v. Zions Savings Bank & Trust
Co., 106 Utah 384, 148 P. 2d 807.
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The question of the extent and nature of the
rights as between the various defendants was never
litigated in this suit, although there is a finding as
to a previous decree as between some of the defendants, and based upon the introduction thereof in
evidence. CR. 300-301)
POINT V
The evidence iustifies the award of 3.5 acre feet
of water.

The principles upon which the duty of water is
to be determined are clear, and sufficienly well established as to make a discussion of them herein perhaps
more academic than helpful from a practical standpoint. Wiel, Water Rights in the Western States,
quoted by Appellants commencing at page 522; Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights, page 1591, quoted
by appellants, set forth basic principles with which
the Utah Courts have come into contact at various
times.
As a result of application of fundamental principles to particular factual situations, this court has
approved a wide variety of water duty ratios. Perhaps one of the highest is to be found in the case
of. Jackson v. Spanish Fork & West Field Irrigation
Co. Utah, 223 P. 2d 827. The rule, however, which
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that case and each water case involving duty of water
teaches, is that every case must necessarily be based
upon its own facts, and that the trial court must
conclude from the best evidence it has before it what
a proper duty is for the particular case. For this reason, other cases are of help only in determining principles generally. Such a case is that of Sharp v. Whitmore, 51 Utah 14, 168 P. 273 relied upon heavily by
the appellants. As stated by Kinney on Irrigation and
\Vater rights, p. 1595, in summarizing his prior discussion:
·'From the above it can readily be seen that
no hard fast rule can be made as to the duty
of \Vater which will apply to all cases. Therefore, the proper duty of water can only be
determined from all the facts surrounding
each particular case."
The very best evidence upon which a court can
base its determination is not a forced parallel between the case at bar and another decided case, but
upon an analysis of the evidence in the particular
case.
Using this approach, let us review the evidence
upon which the court based its decision of 3.5 acre
feet in the present case, and particularly the evidence
of the experts therein involved.
Two experts testified concerning the duty of
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water. Gardner for the plaintiff testified that in his
opinion six acre feet was necessary (Retrial 20).
The basis of his opinion appeared to be two fold: One
the assertion that the entire area was sandy loam
(Retrial 15-16) which statement he could not sustain and later qualified (Retrial 66) on cross examination; and an assertion that this high duty was because of the topography of the tract, that is, it was
uneven with a number of swales and high spots. (Retrial 16). He conceded, however, that the application of si_x acre feet would result in a large flow of
waste water. CRetrial22). Mr. Gardner was not a resident of the area, and had made no tests of any kind
in the a~ea, and in fact was almost completely unfamiliar with the area except for having gone over a
portion of the ground on the day in question.
On the other hand, Leon P. Christenson, a civil
engineer who is also Secretary for the Ashley Upper
Canal Co., and who had 34 years of experience in
the Ashley Valley area including experience as a
farmer, testified that he was familiar with the soil
on the McNaughton place, that it was not excessively
sandy, and that if handled properly three acre feet
would be a proper duty of water (Retrial 93). He
also indicated that the McNaughton land had suffered in the past in certain parts because of over
application of water (Retrial 98, 100). He also was
able to state from experience and first hand knowl-
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edge that the duty of water as figured under the
Ashley Upper Canal Co. was on the basis of 3 acre
feet per acre.
Here then was a witness with the benefit both
of qualification as a civil engineer, and experience
of 34 years in that capacity and as a fanner, and a
person with a direct working knowledge of the land
involved, "\tvho was able to state with certainty what
the duty of water should be in the area, based upon
the soil, the area and first hand knowledge of all of
the factors. Christenson also indicated that the McNaughton ground was only average in the area as
to unevenness (Retrial 100, 101), and that this did
not require that a higher duty of water be imposed,
but rather that a different application be made. (Retrial 101).
J. Ferron Hacking, a farmer, in Ashley Valley
irrigates corn and other grains 3 times a season, pasture every 2 weeks, (Retrial R. 111, 114, 116) and
states that every 10 days is too often for alfalfa. (Retrial 115) . Hacking adds that his land requires more
V\rater than McNaughton's. (Retrial 114).
Jack C. Turner who adjoins McNaughton on the
East, testified that in a year drier than usual he applied water every two weeks, and irrigated corn twice
during the entire year (Retrial 103-104).
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vVith reference to type of soil the witnesses had
this to say. J. Ferron Hacking said that McNaughton
soil was of a clay nature (Retrial 114). Jack C. Turner identified it as being similar to his, a heavy soil
- a clay C;Retrial 106 and Defendants exhibits 1A
and 2A received in evidence Retrial 120). Franklin
Lewis, a Vernal resident, classified the soil as a heavy
clay with sandy loam back further (Retrial 86).

At Point III Respondents have heretofore set out
in detail additional evidence with respect to the 3.5
acre feet duty of water.
It appears that the issue here becomes essentially
one as to whether or not the evidence is competent
and adequate to sustain the Court in its determination
with respect to the duty of water, and it is respectfully
submitted, that the evidence amply sustains the trial
court, and that in fact, a finding based upon witness
Gardner's testimony relative to six acre feet could
not be sustained under the evidence.
As pointed out by this court in the case of Mitchell v. Spanish Fork West Field Irrigation Co. (Utah
2d 313, 265 P. 2d 1016:
" ... it must be kept in mind that the quantity of water acquired is limited to that which
is beneficially used upon the land. The evidence was in direct conflict, yet there is adequate support therein for the conclusion that
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21/2 c.f.s. for 12 hours once a week is all the
water that was put to a beneficial use upon
the land upon which the use was established."
POINT VI
The Decree in no way affects the
McNaughton Canal Waters

The assertion of the appellants at Point VI of
their brief appears to pretty well answer itself. The
respondents at no time asserted ownership rights in
plaintiffs' canal water. Those waters were not involved in the suit between the parties except as they
came in incidentally thereto, and of course, the defendants cannot in any way prevent the plaintiffs
from using their canal water as they see fit. This
is a matter between the plaintiffs and the canal company.
The trial court properly limited the findings,
conclusions and decree to the issues involved between
the parties.
POINT VII
The Court properly determined the Irrigated Acreage
to be 66.03 acres on the· basis of the evidence available
to him.

Appellants apparently concede that there is an
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area of approximately seven acres lying within the
Gulch. There is no evidence that it was irrigated
other than by return seepage waters from the upper
lands. Tl1is seepage, of course, continues, and will
continue. Plaintiffs certainly offered no help to the
court in presenting the question of use of water on
this seven-acre tract. The contention can scarcely
" be made now that tl~ey are entitled to irrigate this
strip when they have never done so before. The court
went upon the premises and viewed them, and certainly was in a position thereafter to determine
whether or not additional waters should be awarded
coveri1~g that property. Since the run-off must necessarily traverse this area, it does not appear that appellants were entitled to more than the 66.03 acres
which the court determined vvere being irrigat~d.
Nor is the issue precluded under the doctrine
of the law of the case as plaintiffs assert. This, for
the reason that the court sent the case back specifically to have the trial court determine how much
water was necessary to satisfy the requirements of
the plaintiffs. (See last sentence of opinion as heretofore quoted at p. 17, of this brief.)
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted, that the trial court
in the present instance adjusted the matter well
within the framework of the evidence produced, and
achieved a result which will stand the test of a review of the evidence. In the rehearing of the matter,
he stayed within the issues which the Supreme Court
returned to him for determination.
This is a matter which is made doubly difficult
by the fact that the parties were able to administer
their various rights on the stream without need of
interference by the court until 1948, and the lower
users vvere able to irrigate without interference from
the upper user, but having resolved itself into a lawsuit, the situation was one fraught with considerable
possibility of additional strife, both legal and physical.
Therefore, the court, treating the matter realistically,
............ , saw the solution to be the insertion of restrictions which would have the effect of eliminating this
source of friction so far as the parties are concerned.
In this he made a wise decision, and one certainly
well within the bounds of his discretion.
We feel that the court was more liberal in granting the appellants 3.5 acre feet of water per acre than
he might have been, but recognize also that he was
considering the> matter from all aspects and from the
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usual and the unusual situations which might be encountered. Accqrdingly, we respectfully submit that
his determination on this score can and will stand
the test of rigid scrutiny.
It is submitted that the trial court pursuant to
the mandate of this court reviewed the question of
beneficial use of water on the lands in question to
determine the proper award to the plaintiffs within
the framework of the law, that he, with great care
and competence, reviewed the factual picture and
weighed the evidence in arriving at his decision, and
that the decision thus rendered is accurate and just.
The trial court has given the court the benefit
of a Memorandum Decision in the case which illustrates his analysis and sound reasoning.
It is respectfully submitted that the decision
herein should be affirmed.

COLTON & HAMMOND
DEAN W. SHEFFIELD
Attorneys for Respondents.
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